March 28, 2024

Early in May of this year, the Western media were actively publishing a confidential report of the UN Panel of Experts, which became available as a result of a leak and concerned with the Russian mercenaries participating in private military companies (PMCs) and engaged in combat operations in various “hotspots”. In response, the Russian media outlets launched a flow of refutations, which indirectly suggests that this topic became very sensitive for the Kremlin. Russia insists on the falsified and prejudice nature of the report. Allegedly, it was commissioned by some anti-Russian lobby, its leak was originally planned, and the evidence base allegedly fails to withstand even a moment’s scrutiny.
On May 19 of this year, Russia’s Permanent Representative to the UN V. Nebenzya, speaking at the Security Council meeting, was vocal about the report being based on unverified data, and its main purpose was to discredit Russian foreign policy in general and in Libya, in particular. However, in the West, the information from this UN report is not subject to the slightest doubt.
The Kremlin, pursuing both government objectives and corporate interests of the Russian elite in the international arena, often resorts to private military companies (PMCs), which are used either secretly (ideally), or informally (out of alignment with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministry). As the top Russian politicians from V. Putin in 2014 in relation to Ukraine to V. Nebenzya in 2020 in relation to Libya used to reiterate – “they are not there” (that is, both mercenaries and servicemen, as well as military equipment of the Russian Federation are allegedly not observed in various “hot spots”).
While the famous French “Foreign Legion” is subordinated to the French Defense Ministry, the Russian legislation prohibits the use of mercenaries, the very practice of mercenarism falls under the scope of the Criminal Code, and PMCs are illegal entities. If human rights activists, journalists and diplomats report about facts of various commitments of Russian mercenaries, then the Kremlin either claims that they lack information and have nothing to do with these individuals, or recognizes that Russian citizens may take part in hostilities abroad, but only in private capacity. Winged expression became Putin’s phrase that those fighting in the south-east of Ukraine are only “miners and tractor drivers of Donbass”, not Russian military servants and mercenaries.
The fact is, Moscow engages PMCs in Syria (since 2015), Sudan (since 2018), Central African Republic (since 2018), Libya (since 2016), Mozambique (since 2019), Mali (since 2019), Venezuela (since 2017) and Ukraine (since 2014). At the state level, Moscow shows interest in those territories where there are still opportunities to position Russia not as a rogue state but as a great power – the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and the post-Soviet space. In turn, at the corporate level, Kremlin elites provide support to a particular leader (party, military force) of a state in exchange for access to various assets (most often raw materials). For example, Russian structures have got contracts in the CAR to protect diamond and gold mines in exchange for part of the proceeds, and in neighboring Sudan they are engaged in training troops, involved in suppression of anti-government protests in the capital (Khartoum), as well as protect gold mines in exchange for part of the profits.

Generally, engagement of Russian PMCs is a sign of involvement of Russian interests and an indication of what Kremlin is trying to achieve in a particular state.
In Syria, Moscow is primarily pursuing maintenance of B.Assad’s regime as a guarantor of operability of its military bases and strongholds in this state. Besides it, they are trying to guarantee themselves significant economic preferences (oil and gas production, infrastructure development orders, cooperation in medicine). Thirdly, they are seeking prevention (or at least weakening) of the permanent presence of US military contingent in the region. Fourthly, their purpose is strengthening their cooperation with Iran. And, finally, Russia is using territories of active combat operations in Syria as a proving ground for the new types of weapons and military equipment, as well as for practicing combat tactics of units.
In the Central African Republic, Russia’s interests extend to uranium, diamonds, gold and oil deposits. Moscow also supplies its arms to this state (the volume of which they are going to increase) and is engaged in training of local militaries.
In Mozambique, Moscow is primarily interested in developing military and technical cooperation and developing local natural resources. In particular, Rosneft has signed an agreement with the Mozambique Hydrocarbon Company on cooperation during natural gas production on Mozambique shelf. In addition, Rosneft plans to build an oil pipeline from the coast of Mozambique to Zimbabwe.
In Libya, the case is Russia’s interests in the oil and gas sector, as well as their ambitions to control a number of migration routes from the African continent to European. The latter provides Moscow with extremely serious and very powerful instruments of influence both on internal and foreign policy of the European Union, as well as – almost unlimited opportunities for infiltration of its agency throughout the Maghreb and Mediterranean region.
According to the UN report, up to 1.2 thousand Russian mercenaries from the PMC Wagner Group fight today in Libya on the side of the Libyan National Army under the command of Field Marshal Kh. Haftar. The latter opposes the government of national consent of Libya (Tripoli city), officially recognized by the UN Security Council. Figures from the UN report were confirmed by Turkish President R.T. Erdogan, who declared presence of even 2 thousand Russian mercenaries in Libya. Moreover, R.T. Erdogan stressed that, according to his information, Russia was managing the conflict in Libya “at the highest level”.
Fighters from the Wagner Group take part in aerial and artillery shelling, as well as in active sniper shellfire. This PMC has been repeatedly identified through the use of equipment designed for the Armed Forces of Russia exclusively.
In addition, PMC commanders recruit fighters to participate in war in Libya, at least among the Syrian citizens (possibly in other disadvantaged countries). At least, the Syrian mercenaries are promised a salary of $1 thousand per month paid with a tool like this one to create w2 online slips, as well as compensation from $25 thousand to $50 thousand in case of injury or death. Thus, by recruiting, direct involvement in the conflict and supplying arms, Russia overtly violates the UN declarations, the embargo on arms supplies to Libya and the final declaration of the Berlin conference of January 19, 2020, which calls to refrain from fighting in Libya.
According to UN experts, currently more than 5 thousand fighters experienced in the whole range of military specialties are engaged by the PMC Wagner Group. Basically, PMC is equipped with people from among the former military, retired employees of the Interior Ministry and the FSB, especially veterans of the Vympel unit within the FSB Special Operations Center. However, given the deplorable state of the Russian economy and the high level of unemployment in the state, the Wagner Group recruits inexperienced young men, in particular, giving preference to those with sadistic inclinations and special predilections for tortures.
It is assumed that this PMC got its name following the call sign of D. Utkin (“Wagner”), who runs the organization and organise the operations. Meanwhile, D. Utkin also manages the Concord consulting company, which belongs to a personal V. Putin’s friend – E. Prigozhin. Generally, Wagner Group operates using a whole network of interdependent real and fake companies. All of them are somehow controlled by E. Prigozhin (this includes teams of cyber spies, hackers and so-called troll factories).
Also, other PMCs mentioned in the report of UN experts are “Shield” (is very little known) and “Russian Security Systems” (“RSB-Group”), led by former FSB officer O. Krinitsyn. The latter illegitimately executed a commercial contract for mine and explosive clearance (near the city of Benghazi), and its mechanics team serves the aviation of the “Libyan National Army” (for example, at Al-Khadim air base the Russian-made MiG and Su fighters are improved).
Thus, the Russian authorities do not rely on the development of the country’s economy (and departure from the raw materials model), but rather on the illusory maintenance of the decaying image of “great power”. To this end, Moscow is waging a series of hybrid wars, sending its military to weak countries and unstable regions (from close Georgia to distant Venezuela). Somewhere, Russia unleashes a massacre itself (as in Ukraine), somewhere it gets involved in already existing conflicts (as in Syria).
In any case, Russia always attempts to act in a covert manner, never recognizing participation of its military in this or that “hot spot”. As Kremlin usually assures, “we did not send our military anywhere, no Russian troops are there, except for some volunteers who came to fight on their own”. We may only wonder, where would so many initiative Russian citizens come from, needing neither family, nor work, nor bread, nor spectacles, just to dart off to some backward wilderness and shoot to their heart’s content?

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